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THE SPECTRUM OF UNCERTAINTY LEFT BY ZADVYDAS V
DAVIS: IS THE ALIEN DETENTION PROVISION OF
THE USA PATRIOT ACT CONSTITUTIONAL?
MAK BASTLAN*
Terrorists live in the shadows, under the cover of darkness. We
will shine the light ofjustice on them. Americans alive today and
yet to be born and freedom-loving people everywhere will have new
reason to hope because our enemies now have new reason to fear.
Attorney General, John Ashcroft
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11th, 2001, terrorists shocked the world when
they hijacked four American airplanes and guided three of them
into national landmarks - killing thousands.' In the wake of these
unexpected tragedies, the United States was suddenly captivated by
a sense of fear and vulnerability. Just days after the tragedies, in
front of a live national television audience, President George Bush
declared that the United States would now engage in a "new kind of
war... a war on terrorism. '"2
The war on terrorism is unlike any other war this country has
ever faced; our enemy targets innocent civilians - on American
soil.3 In response to this unprecedented dilemma, Congress en-
* This Note was awarded the 2002 Ernst Stiefel Writing Award.
1. Thousands of innocent American civilians were killed in the attacks, con-
ducted at the height of the morning commute: In Washington D.C., 189 people per-
ished (including 64 on American Airlines Flight 77). Outside Pittsburgh, 44 people
died on hijacked United Airlines Flight 93. In New York City, 2,830 civilians perished. A
Nation Challenged: The Toll; Toll from Attack at Trade Center is Down Sharply, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2001, at Al.
2. ABC Special Report: Presidential Address (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 20,
2001).
3. America's military and economic symbols were targeted in the attacks. Two
airplanes were guided into New York City's World Trade Center - America's symbol of
economic might. Minutes later, a plane crashed into the Pentagon - America's central
military defense center. A fourth plane, which crashed in a Pittsburgh suburb, was be-
lieved to be headed toward either the United States Capital building or the White
House - both powerful symbols of the United States government. The only other attack
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acted the USA Patriot Act,4 legislation that was designed to grant
the government the tools necessary to effectively fight terrorism.
One such tool is § 412 of the Act, 5 which enables the Attorney Gen-
eral to detain a terrorist suspect until he is no longer deemed a
threat. Of course, this may lead to the indefinite detention of sus-
pected terrorists, if doing so is necessary for national security. Crit-
ics argue that the prospect of indefinite detention conflicts with the
Supreme Court's holding in Zadvydas v. Davis.6 There, the Court
stated that the indefinite detention of aliens 7 was unconstitutional,
but left open the possibility of detaining terrorist suspects.8 This
Note argues that the holding in Zadvydas would not apply to the
USA Patriot Act since Congress acted pursuant to the doctrine of
plenary power. Moreover, the war on terrorism represents a "special
circumstance" that may necessitate preventative detention. 9
Part II of this Note will provide an overview of immigration law,
plenary power and the alien detention provision of the Patriot Act.
Part III will examine the key case in the spectrum of alien detention
- Zadvydas v. Davis. In addition, this section will lay out the due
process challenges to the Patriot Act and the government's argu-
ment that the Act falls within the well-established doctrine of ple-
nary power. Part IV will discuss the legality of § 412 based upon
plenary power as well as the "special circumstances" exception to
due process. Part V will conclude that the Zadvydas holding does
not apply to § 412 of the Patriot Act since the Act explicitly states
of this magnitude on American soil was conducted at America's military base in Pearl
Harbor, which killed 2,400 Americans. The victims in these attacks were primarily mili-
tary personnel. A Nation Challenged: The Toll; Toll from Attack at Trade Center is Down
Sharply, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at Al.
4. See H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).
5. See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412(a)(6) (2001).
6. Deborah Barfield, Critics Wary of Bid to Curtail Rights; A Rush in Response to Ter-
ror, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 2, 2001, at A04. See also Ronald Weich, Upsetting Checks and
Balances, Congressional Hostility Toward the Courts in Times of Crisis, at http://www.
aclu.org/safeandfree/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2001) (discussing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678 (2001)).
7. The term "alien" means any person not a citizen or national of the United
States. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (3) (2001).
8. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678.
9. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court left open the possibility of a special circum-
stance. Id. at 690, 696.
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the powers of the Attorney General and because preventative deten-
tion is essential during the war on terrorism.
II. AMERICA'S PERPETUAL STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM AND SECURITY
A. Immigration Reform and National Security
The American government has utilized immigration laws to
monitor immigrants and to reduce the threats they may pose to
national security. The first such measure was the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. The Act granted the Attorney General the
authority to arrest and detain aliens while awaiting a determination
of whether the alien should be removed from the United States.10
The Attorney General has since delegated these powers to the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS)."1
The threat of terrorism has caused a multitude of reforms to
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On April 19, 1995,
Timothy McVeigh,1 2 an American citizen, bombed a federal office
building in Oklahoma City. The destruction and loss of life were far
greater than any act of terrorism to strike the United States up to
that point. In total, 168 people lost their lives in the explosion.
13
Congress responded with the enactment of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act1 4 ("AEDPA"), legislation designed to
combat potential terrorism.1 5 Signed into law by President Bill Clin-
10. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1537 (Supp. 1997)).
11. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [here-
inafter IIRAIRA], Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 (1996).
12. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998).
13. "On April 19, 1995, at 9:03 a.m., just after parents dropped their children off
for day care at the Murray Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City, the unthink-
able happened. A massive bomb inside a rental truck exploded, blowing half of the
nine-story building into oblivion. A stunned nation watched as the bodies of men,
women, and children were pulled from the rubble for nearly two weeks. When the .
smoke cleared and the exhausted rescue workers packed up and left, 168 people were
dead in the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil up to that point." See The Bombing, at CNN
Interactive: Oklahoma City Tragedy, http://www.cnn.com/US/OKC/bombing.html
(last visited Nov. 22, 2001).
14. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [hereinafter AEDPA],
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C. (Supp. 1997)).
15. See, e.g., Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996, S.
1664, 104th Cong. (1996); The Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995, H.R.
1915, 104th Cong. (1995). The 103rd Congress generated at least 13 bills relating to
2003]
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ton, the Act authorized $1 billion to be spent on fighting terrorism
in the United States and reserved the right of the government to
deny entrance to any foreigner who was believed to be associated
with a terrorist organization.1 6 The Act also expanded the group of
aliens subject to mandatory detention, eliminating provisions that
permitted release of criminal aliens who had at one time been law-
fully admitted to the United States.1 7 Current restrictions ofjudicial
review of deportation orders began with § 440(a) of the AEDPA. 18
Congress further revised the INA with the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("Reform
Act") .19 The Reform Act liberalized the pre-existing law by shorten-
ing the alien removal period from six months to ninety days.20 Fur-
thermore, it mandated detention of certain criminal aliens during
the removal proceedings and for the subsequent ninety day re-
moval period, and added a post-removal provision. 2'
The AEDPA and the Reform Act also enacted the most com-
prehensive changes in decades to the judicial review provisions of
the INA. While both Acts preserved the fundamental structure of
criminal aliens. See Criminal Aliens Hearings, note 1, at 177-82 (statement of Chris Sale,
Deputy Commissioner, Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization
Service).
16. Id.
17. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1277. The Seventh Circuit held that
AEDPA § 440(a) did not violate the Due Process clause because the statute preserves an
"independent judicial role in determining whether the alien is deportable. See Yang v.
INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1190-91 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that it is only after the person has
been determined, by agency and court, to be an alien who is "deportable" by reason of
"serious crimes" that jurisdiction ends. Aliens receive ample protection: trial-type hear-
ings, administrative appeals, and review in an Article III court "of any claim of right to
be" in the United States; thus they receive the process that the Constitution requires),
cert. denied sub nom. Katsoulis v. INS, 522 U.S. 1027 (1997). See also Boston-Bollers v.
INS, 106 F.3d 352, 354-55 (11th Cir. 1997) (AEDPA § 440(a) does not violate the due
process clause because the Constitution does not give aliens the right to judicial review
of deportation orders; rather than violating Article III, § 440(a) illustrates the concept
of separation of powers envisioned by the Constitution); Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396,
399-400 (9th Cir. 1996).
18. See Lenni B. Benson, The Jurisdictional Maze Must Be Understood and Navigated,
N.Y.LJ., June 14, 1999, at 9.
19. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 to 3009-724 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Supp. 1997)).
20. Illegal Immigration Reform Act of 1996, Div. C, §§ 303, 305, 110 Stat. 3009-




appellate review over individual deportation and removal orders,
they imposed many unprecedented restrictions on that review.
22
The AEDPA and the Reform Act form the foundation for the USA
Patriot Act - a product of the September 11th attacks.
B. America's Fight Against Terrorism - The Development of the USA
Patriot Act
In response to the September 11th attacks, Congress acted
quickly to develop legislation that would further enhance home-
land security.23 Just weeks after the events, Attorney General John
Ashcroft proposed the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Proposal "Discussion
Draft." Most notably, § 202 of Ashcroft's Sept. 19 "Discussion Draft"
allowed for the arrest and incarceration for indefinite periods, of
any non-citizen whom the Attorney General has "reason to believe
may commit, further, or facilitate [terrorist acts, or] engage in any
other activity that endangers the national security of the United
States."2 4 Thus, indefinite detention would be allowed based upon
mere suspicion. 25 This was immediately criticized as being beyond
the bounds of constitutionality, a harsh infringement on civil liber-
ties, and lacking in adequate procedural safeguards. 26
Congress eventually agreed on the provisions for the "Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
22. §§ 303, 305 of the Illegal Immigration Reform Act.
23. The Department of Justice detained 952 people in the eight weeks following
September 1 1th. This mass detention of individuals was based on the investigation into
the terrorist attacks on America. In order to detain these suspects, the INS utilized an
expansive rule put in place on September 17, 2001. Enacted under the agency's rule-
making power, it allowed detention, without charge, for an indefinite "reasonable pe-
riod of time" in "the event of an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance." The
INS stated that the rule was needed "to ensure that the Service has sufficient time,
personnel and resources to process cases - including establishing true identities" in
connection with the September l1th, 2001 attacks. Thus, though the Department of
Justice gained broad powers under the USA Patriot Act, it also became constrained by a
new seven-day limit on detentions. The Department ofJustice may argue that the seven-
day provision does not apply to those already detained. SeeJohn Lancaster, House Ap-
proves Anti-Terrorism Bill: Bush Cheers Lawmakers Quick Action But Civil Liberties Advocates
Are Alarmed, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2001, at A21. This Note will not delve into this issue.
24. Stuart Taylor Jr., Let's Debate - Ashcroft's Bill to Combat Terrorism will Quickly Pro-
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quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act
of 2001."27 Under this Act, 8 U.S.C § 1101 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act was amended to allow officials to detain individuals
suspected of terrorist activity for up to seven days without filing
charges against them or allowing them to petition a court for their
release.2 8 After the seven days, pursuant to § 412(a) (5), the alien
will either be released or detained if there is any immigration viola-
tion, subject to deportation hearings.2 9 Most notably, the Patriot
Act affords the Attorney General the ability to detain an immigrant
during the entire deportation hearing if he "reasonably believes"
the alien may have engaged or assisted in any terrorist activity and
his removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future. 30 The
government is required to review the detention of any non-citizen
every six months and show that his or her release would endanger
national security or the safety of Americans under § 412(a) (7).31 In
addition, under § 412(b), aliens may challenge their detention in
habeas corpus proceedings.3 2 The bill routes all such cases exclu-
sively to the District of Columbia district court.33
C. The Plenary Power Doctrine
Over the course of the last century the Supreme Court had
developed a "hands off' approach to immigration law.3 4 This prin-
ciple of full federal authority and judicial deference is generally
known as the "plenary power doctrine. ' 35 Courts have justified in-
27. H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).
28. H.R. 3162 at § 412(a).
29. Id. at § 412(a)(5)
30. Id. at § 412 (a) (3) (A); § 412(a) (6). An alien detained solely under paragraph
(1) who has not been removed under § 241 (a)(1)(A), § 1231. Detention and removal
of aliens ordered removed (a) Detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered re-
moved. (1) Removal period. (A) In general. Except as otherwise provided in this sec-
tion, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien
from the United States within a period of ninety-days (in this section referred to as the
"removal period").
31. H.R. 3162 at § 412(a) (7).
32. H.R. 3162 at § 412 (b).
33. H.R. 3162 at § 412 (b)(2).
34. Victoria Cook Capitaine, Life In Prison Without a Trial. The Indefinite Detention of
Immigrants In the United States, 79 TEX. L. REv. 769, 774 (2001).
35. See generally Charles D. Wiesselberg, The Exclusion and Detention ofAliens: Lessons
from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 939 (1995) (provid-
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voking the plenary power doctrine, and have deferred to the legisla-
tive and executive branches, in cases where they perceive nation-
al security to be an issue 36 or where they fear that a hostile
foreign government is attempting to compel the United States
to accept its "undesirable" citizens. 37 The authority of Congress
over admission, exclusion, and deportation of aliens is plenary.
38
Congress may exclude aliens altogether,39  or prescribe the
ing that the plenary power doctrine is rooted in three related principles: (1) immigra-
tion policy is the responsibility of the federal government; (2) the primary federal
immigration authorities are the legislative and executive branches; and (3) the judiciary
has extremely limited, if any, power to review the immigration decisions of the other
branches).
36. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 547 (1950).
Knauff was a German citizen who sought admission to the United States in 1948. Id. at
539. Though she had recently married an American army veteran of World War II, the
Court upheld her exclusion from the United States based on unsubstantiated allega-
tions that she was a spy and thus a threat to national security. Id.at 547. The Court
found Knauffs exclusion without a hearing was permissible because "whatever [the]
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned." Id. at 544 (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660, 664
(1892) (upholding the exclusion of an alien without a hearing on the basis that she was
likely to become a public charge)).
37. See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (speculating
that judicial decisions requiring excludable aliens to be released into American society,
when neither their own country nor any other will admit them, could encourage the
same sort of problems the United States experienced with Cuba during negotiations
over the Mariel boatlift refugees); see also Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 975 (11th Cir.
1984) (expressing the fear that judicial intervention in immigration matters, i.e. secur-
ing the release of otherwise excludable aliens, would create the intolerable circum-
stances in which other nations could purposefully send nationals over to the United
States, then refuse to take them back, in effect compelling the United States to grant
these aliens physical admission, and thus undermining the integrity of the United States
borders).
38. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
39. See Weisselberg, supra note 35, at 938 (noting that courts have generally
viewed the federal government's immigration authority as an inseparable part of their
foreign affairs power); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606
(1889) (advancing the notion that, because a nation's most important function is to
maintain security against foreign aggression and to preserve independence, all other
concerns must remain subordinate). In the Ping case, which became known as the "Chi-
nese Exclusion Case," the Court emphasized that "it does not matter in what form such
aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its na-
tional character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us." See id. at 6; see
also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (arguing that because the power to
exclude aliens is fundamental to a nation's sovereignty, i.e. the necessity of maintaining
normal international relations and defending the country against foreign aggression),
it should be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government).
2003]
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conditions upon which they may come into or remain in the
country.
4 0
Plenary power has been invoked to shield the actions of Con-
gress and the INS from judicial scrutiny based on the notion that
immigration is a matter of foreign affairs.41 Thus, an inquiry into
the constitutionality of an immigration law or action by the INS
must first clear the high hurdle of the plenary power doctrine.42
The Supreme Court held that in order to overcome a constitutional
challenge on a matter of immigration, the government must "meet
the standard of rationally advancing some legitimate purpose."43
However, until recently, the exploration into the constitutionality
of an immigration matter had become as simple as asking whether
the government is acting within the arena of immigration law.44
The Supreme Court has recently been hesitant to utilize the
doctrine of plenary power. This trend is evident in three recent Su-
preme Court decisions: INS v. St. Cyr,45 Nguyen v. INS,46 and finally,
Zadvydas v. Davis.47 These cases do not explicitly overrule plenary
power precedents, but rather, render plenary power inapplicable
where past courts would have applied it.48
40. Id. at 753.
41. The landmark cases that best exhibit the history of the government's plenary
power over immigration matters by the courts include Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581 (1889); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); United States ex
rel. Knauff Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952);
Harisiades v. Shaugnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Leng May Ma v. Bar-
ber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787 (1977);Jean.v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); and Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292
(1993); Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (2001).
42. Capitaine, supra note 34, at 774.
43. See Pores, 507 U.S. at 306.
44. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488-89
(1999) (reasoning that deportation for violation of the immigration laws is not uncon-
stitutional even though one of the reasons for deportation might infringe on freedom
of association).
45. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
46. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
47. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678.
48. Trevor Morrison, The Supreme Court and Immigration Law: A New Commitment to
Avoiding Hard Constitutional Questions?, FindLaw's Writ, at http://writ.findlaw.com/
commentary/20010731Kmorrison.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
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The Supreme Court began its apparent shift from the utiliza-
tion of plenary power in INS v. St. Cyr.49 In St. Cyr, the Supreme
Court construed a provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) which, on its face, appeared
to deprive all courts of jurisdiction to review removal orders.
50 If
the Court interpreted the provision that way, however, it would
then have to determine whether the provision runs afoul of the
Constitution's Suspension Clause.5 1 The Suspension Clause pro-
vides that "[t] he privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it."'52 Thus, assessing the Suspension Clause's im-
plications in the immigration field would have required the Court
to balance the Clause against the plenary power doctrine. 53
Instead of addressing this issue, the Court decided the case
based on the avoidance canon - the rule that if a statute can be
plausibly construed in more than one way, courts should avoid con-
structions that would place the statute in constitutional doubt.54
Under this heightened level of scrutiny, the Court held against the
government. 55 The Court's refusal to take the approach that the
plenary power doctrine is virtually unlimited reflects some level of
discomfort with the doctrine. 5
6
The Supreme Court also skirted the issue of plenary power in
Nguyen v. INS.5 7 The government argued that congressional deci-
sions about which foreign-born persons may claim United States cit-
izenship are exercises of its plenary power over immigration. 58 The
plenary power, the government urged, mandates judicial deference
to those decisions, just as it does to congressional decisions in all
other areas of immigration law.59 Though the Supreme Court sided
with the government, it upheld the challenged provisions only after
49. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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subjecting them to what purported to be full constitutional
scrutiny.60
III. THE DEBATE EMERGES: IS THE ALIEN DETENTION PROVISION
OF THE PATRIOT ACT CONSTITUTIONAL?
A. Limits on Alien Detention: Zadvydas v. Davis
On June 28, 2001, the United States Supreme Court compro-
mised the power of the IIRIRA and arguably, congressional plenary
power, with its decision in Zadvydas v. Davis.61 The Zadvydas hold-
ing also represents the principal argument against the constitution-
ality of "indefinite"62 detention of aliens.
The case considered two separate instances of detention. 63 The
first involved Kestutis Zadvydas, a resident alien who was born, ap-
parently of Lithuanian parents, in Germany. 64 Zadvydas had a long
criminal record involving drug crimes, attempted robbery, at-
tempted burglary and theft.65 In addition, he had a history of flight
from both criminal and deportation proceedings. 66 He was released
on parole and taken into INS custody and, in 1994, ordered
deported.
67
Upon his order of removal, the INS made several attempts to
have Zadvydas deported to both Lithuania and Germany. 68 Lithua-
60. Id.
61. As a result of the holding in Zadvydas v. Davis, on July 19, 2001, U.S. Attorney
General John D. Ashcroft ordered the Immigration and Naturalization Service to start
releasing 3,400 nationals who have completed sentences for criminal convictions in the
U.S., but whose home countries will not allow them to return and threatened to sanc-
tion their home countries that refuse to accept them. Cheryl W. Thompson, INS to Free
3,400 Ex-Convicts, WASH. POST, July 20, 2001, at A2.
62. "Viet Dinh, assistant attorney general for legal policy, disputes the term 'indef-
inite detention.' The bill, he says, simply allows the Government to revoke the bond of
dangerous aliens while they are awaiting deportation proceedings. It is 'well within the
bounds of constitutionality,' Dinh says, pointing to the exception for terrorists or na-
tional security matters mentioned in the Zadvydas opinion."Jonathan Ringel, Congress is
Set to Vote on Measures to Change Criminal and Immigration Law, FULTON CiTy DAILY RE-
PORT, Oct. 11, 2001.
63. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678.
64. Id. at 682.
65. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684.
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nia refused to accept him because he was neither a Lithuanian citi-
zen nor a permanent resident.69 Similarly, Germany would not
accept him because he was not a German citizen.70 Thus, the INS
kept him in custody after the expiration of the removal period in
order to conduct further attempts to deport him. 71 In September
1995, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 challenging his continued detention. 72
The second case involved Kim Ho Ma, a Cambodian who fled
to the United States at the age of seven. 73 In 1995, at the age of 17,
Ma was involved in a gang-related shooting, convicted of man-
slaughter, and sentenced to thirty-eight months' imprisonment.
7 4
He served two years, after which he was released into INS custody.
In light of his conviction of an aggravated felony, a deportable of-
fense, Ma was ordered removed. 75 Similar to Zadvydas, the country
of Ma's birth, Cambodia, refused to accept him before the expira-
tion of the ninety day removal period. 76 Nonetheless, the INS con-
tinued to keep Ma in custody because, in light of his former gang
membership, the nature of his crime, and his planned participation
in a prison hunger strike, the INS was "unable to conclude that Mr.
Ma would remain nonviolent and not violate the conditions of his
release."77
Generally, when an alien is found to be unlawfully present in
the United States and a final order of removal has been entered,
the government secures the alien's removal during a subsequent
ninety day statutory "removal period." When the government is un-
able to remove an alien, like Zadvydas and Ma, further detention is





73. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 685. (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§1101 (a) (43) (F)) (defining certain violent
crimes as aggravated felonies), § 1227(a)(2) (A) (iii) (1994 ed., Supp. IV) (aliens con-
victed of aggravated felonies are deportable).
76. Id.
77. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 685.
20031
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removable alien whom poses a risk to the community "may be de-
tained" beyond the ninety day removal period.
78
The issue in Zadvydas was whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (6)
grants the Attorney General the authority to detain deportable
aliens indefinitely or merely for a "period reasonably necessary" af-
ter the expiration of the removal period. 79 The government main-
tained that indefinite civil detention is justified under the statute
since it prevents flight and protects the community.80 Furthermore,
the government argued that there was clear congressional intent to
grant the Attorney General the power indefinitely to detain an alien
ordered removed, and therefore the Court must defer to Congress
under the doctrine of plenary power.
81
In what purported to be full constitutional scrutiny, the Court
held that indefinite detention of aliens would raise "serious consti-
tutional concerns," and therefore the statute contains an implicit
"reasonable time" limitation.8 2 The Court reasoned that if the goal
of detention is no longer practically attainable, detention no longer
"bears [a] reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individ-
ual [was] committed. 83 Therefore, there was a violation of the due
process rights of the detainees. The Court stated that the govern-
ment's first justification, prevention of flight, was "weak or nonexis-
tent where removal seems a remote possibility."84 Similarly, the
Court discounted preventative detention based upon the second
justification, protection of the community, since it is limited only to
"specially dangerous individuals."8 5
The Zadvydas Court did not utilize the doctrine of plenary
power and the heightened deference it invokes.8 6 The majority
found no clear indication that Congress intended to give the Attor-
ney General authority indefinitely to detain aliens.8 7 The statute at
78. Id. at 682. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6) (Supp. V 1994)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 691.
81. Id. at 695.
82. Id. at 682.
83. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738
(1972)).
84. Id.
85. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
86. Id. at 695.
87. Id. at 696-97.
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issue was premised on 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (6), which stated that
when an alien has been found unlawfully to be present in the
United States and a final order of removal has been entered, the
government ordinarily secures the alien's removal during a subse-
quent ninety day statutory "removal period," during which time the
alien normally is held in custody.88 However, a special statute at
issue in Zadvydas, authorized further detention if the government
fails to remove the alien during those ninety days.89 It stated:
An alien ordered removed [1] who is inadmissible
... [2] [or] removable [as a result of violations of status
requirements or entry conditions, violations of criminal
law, or reasons of security or foreign policy] or [3] who
has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk
to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of
removal, may be detained beyond the removal period
and, if released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of
supervision. 90
Ultimately, the Court determined that the word "may" is am-
biguous and does not afford the Attorney General unlimited discre-
tion to detain an alien indefinitely.9 1 Furthermore, the Court
maintained that the protection of the community from dangerous
aliens, in this statute, was merely a secondary statutory purpose.
92
Thus, the government's argument under the guise of plenary
power was rejected.
93
Justice Brennan also noted that plenary power is subject to im-
portant constitutional limitations.9 4 Congressional authority is lim-
ited "by the Constitution itself and the considerations of public
policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all
civilized nations."95 Here, the Court stated that Congress did not
88. Id. at 682.
89. Id.
90. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 2495 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §(a)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V)).
91. Id. at 697.
92. Id. at 690-91.
93. Id. at 699.
94. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
95. Id. at 695.
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utilize constitutional means since aliens are subject to an indefinite
term of imprisonment.96
The Zadvydas majority did state that there might be "special
circumstances" that would outweigh an alien's right to due process
or allow Congress to utilize the doctrine of plenary power.97 For
example, the Court reasoned that due process can be overcome if
the preventative detention is limited to "specially dangerous indi-
viduals. s9 8 The Court stated that the provision authorizing deten-
tion in Zadvydas "did not apply narrowly to 'a small segment of
particularly dangerous individuals,' [like] suspected terrorists, but
broadly to aliens ordered removed for many and various reasons."99
Therefore, a key factor in the Zadvydas holding was the unlimited
scope of the detention provision. With regard to plenary power, the
majority holding in Zadvydas noted, "neither do we consider terror-
ism ... where special arguments might be made for forms of pre-
ventative detention and for heightened deference to the judgments
of the political branches with respect to matters of national secur-
ity." 100 In sum, the dictum in Zadvydas has left the door open for
litigation with regard to alien-terrorist detention."" t
96. Id. (citing The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889).
97. Id. at 696.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 691.
100. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696.
101. Pursuant to the decision in Zadvydas, the Department ofJustice has published
an interim rule in the Federal Register to amend the U.S. INS' procedures governing
review process of aliens who are subject to a final order of removal, deportation, or
exclusion. The interim rule, which was effective as of November 14, 2001, adds new
provisions to INS' procedures for determining: (1) whether aliens with final orders of
removal are likely to be removed within a reasonable amount of time; and (2) whether
they should remain in INS custody or be released into the United States pending their
removal. Most notably, the rule also allows the INS to continue detention of aliens who
are not reasonably likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future under
special circumstances, consistent with the Supreme Court ruling. The special circum-
stances identified in the regulations involve 1) aliens who have highly contagious dis-
eases that pose a danger to the public; 2) aliens who pose foreign policy concerns; 3)
aliens who pose national security and terrorism concerns; and 4) individuals who are
specially dangerous due to a mental condition or personality disorder. Justice Department
Implements Zadvydas v. Davis Supreme Court Decision, Dept. of Justice Webpage (Nov. 14,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/November/01_ins595.htm.
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B. One Provision -Two Conflicting Views
The constitutionality of the alien detention provision of the
USA Patriot Act will likely be challenged. Critics maintain that the
alien detentions infringe on the due process rights of the detainees.
The foundation for this challenge is based upon the holding in
Zadvydas. 102 The government would likely argue that the Act isjusti-
fied under the doctrine of plenary power or alternatively, under the
"special circumstances" exception to due process. To evaluate a
challenge to the Act, the court must first determine what standard
of proof to apply - heightened deference or full constitutional
scrutiny.1
0 3
The constitutionality of the Patriot Act may hinge on what level
of scrutiny the Court applies. Critics of § 412 will argue that the Act
must be subjected to a full constitutional scrutiny. This level of scru-
tiny is typically applied in due process cases, including Zadvydas. In
Zadvydas, the Supreme Court did not apply a rational basis test
since the ability of the Attorney General indefinitely to detain an
alien was not based upon clear congressional intent and therefore,
did not fall under the scope of plenary power.
However, the Court may decide that the detention of terrorist
suspects during the war on terrorism is justified and that the gov-
ernment's actions fall within the scope of plenary power. This argu-
ment is supported by the dictum in Zadvydas, which states: "special
arguments might be made for forms of preventative detention and
for heightened deference to the judgments of the political
branches with respect to matters of national security."'1 4 Thus,
under the doctrine of plenary power, the Court would utilize a ra-
tional basis test.
After the Court determines which level of review to apply, it
will evaluate the argument that the alien detention provision is an
unconstitutional violation of due process. Critics of the Patriot Act
argue that trifling or unproven immigration violations could be
used as pretexts to detain innocent people based on mere suspi-
cions of terrorist designs - thereby infringing on their due process
102. Id.
103. Recently, the Supreme Court has not consistently applied either standard in
immigration cases.
104. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696.
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rights. 10 5 More specifically, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) states, "what amounts to a life sentence should be at mini-
mum based on clear proof at a hearing, not on a certification of
merely the level of suspicion that normally allows only a brief stop
and frisk106 on the street."' 0 7 Moreover, the ACLU maintains that
the "Court made clear in its analysis that preventative detention
would not be allowed in the absence of 'strong procedural protec-
tions'. . . it explicitly indicated that indefinite detention would not
be allowed 'broadly [for] aliens ordered removed for various rea-
sons, including tourist visa violations.'"1 08 The dictum in Zadvydas,
which suggests that there is a "special circumstances" exception to
due process, is discounted as merely dictum. 10 9 Alternatively, pro-
ponents of the Patriot Act argue that the Zadvydas decision carves
out a special exception for the detention of terrorists, thereby satis-
fying the standards of due process."10
In sum, an analysis on the constitutionality of § 412 must pro-
ceed first with a discussion on whether plenary power - and its def-
erential standard of review would apply. Next, if the Court refuses
to apply the doctrine of plenary power, an analysis can proceed as
to whether alien-terrorist detention is constitutional under a "spe-
cial circumstances" exception to due process under a heightened
level of scrutiny.
IW. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PATRIOT ACT EXAMINED
The constitutionality of the alien detention provision of the
USA Patriot Act can be established on two levels. First, the Act
grants unambiguous powers to the Attorney General with respect to
national security. Therefore, under a rational basis test utilized
when the doctrine of plenary power is invoked, § 412 is constitu-
105. Stuart TaylorJr., Let's Debate - Ashcroft's Bill to Combat Terrorism will Quickly Protect
Us and Potentially Hurt Us. So let's Pass it Now and Rethink it Soon, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1,
2001, at 54.
106. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
107. American Civil Liberties Union, How the USA Patriot Act Permits Indefinite Deten-
tion of Immigrants Who are Not Terrorists, at http://archive.aclu.org/congress/




110. Ringel, supra note 62.
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tional. Second, if the Court does not broach the subject of plenary
power, the statute is nevertheless constitutional under the height-
ened standard applied in Zadvydas. Ultimately, a "special argu-
ment" can be made that the detention of alien-terrorist suspects is
essential to procure national security during the war on
terrorism.'a
A. The Applicability of the Plenary Power Doctrine
The provision that entails the possibility of indefinite detention
in the Patriot Act is distinguishable from 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (6),
ruled unconstitutional in Zadvydas. In § 412 (a) (5) of the USA Pa-
triot Act, it states:
The Attorney General shall place a [certified]
11 2
alien in removal proceedings, or shall charge the alien
with a criminal offense, not later than seven days after the
commencement of such detention. If the requirement of
the preceding sentence is not satisfied, the Attorney Gen-
eral shall release the alien.
113
After the seven days, if it is determined that the alien will either
have criminal or immigration charges filed against him,
§ 412(a) (6) places a limitation on indefinite detention:
An alien detained [as a certified alien] who has not
been removed under § 241 (a) (1) (A), and whose removal
is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, may be
detained for additional periods of up to six months only if
the release of the alien will threaten the national security
of the United States or the safety of the community or any
person.1
14
The important difference between 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and § 412
(a) (6) of the USA Patriot Act lies in the specificity of the alien de-
tention guidelines. In 8 U.S.C. § 1231, the alien "may be detained
111. The term "special argument" was coined in Zadvydas to describe instances
where "preventative detention" and "heightened deference to the judgments of the
political branches with respect to matters of national security" could be made. See
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696.
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beyond the removal period."11 5 The Supreme Court maintained
that this was too ambiguous and therefore beyond the scope of ple-
nary power. 116 However, the Patriot Act, § 412(a) (6), explicitly
states that the alien may be detained for "additional periods of up
to six months ... if the release of the alien.. . will threaten national
security."' 1 7 Thus, there is no longer an undefined period as to
which aliens may be detained, but rather, a specified length of time
of six months provided in the statute. "Congress has made its intent
in the statute clear, [and the court, therefore], must give effect to
that intent."'1
8
In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and im-
migration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unaccept-
able if applied to citizens."19 The deferential stance with respect to
immigration matters is taken since: "decisions in these matters may
implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety
of classifications must be defined in light of changing political and
economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a charac-
ter more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive
than to the Judiciary."120
The USA Patriot Act is explicit with regards to the power of the
Attorney General indefinitely to detain terrorist suspects. 121 There-
fore, the Court is more likely to utilize the doctrine of plenary
power as the basis for a holding of constitutionality. However, as in
Zadvydas, if the Court rejects the application of plenary power while
interpreting the USA Patriot Act, the Court then will proceed with a
due process analysis.
B. The Due Process Argument Analyzed
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause forbids the gov-
ernment from depriving any person of liberty without due process
115. §412(a)(6).
116. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696.
117. §412(a)(6).
118. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 (citing Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000)).
119. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79 (1976).
120. Id. at 81.
121. See supra Part II.B.
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of law. 122 Liberty interests are not impenetrable, however, because
"the Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in
appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty inter-
est."1 23 Government detention will be upheld in certain "special
and 'narrow' non-punitive 'circumstances' where a special justifica-
tion..., outweighs the 'individual's constitutionally protected inter-
est in avoiding physical restraint.' "124 For example, in times of war
or insurrection, the government may detain individuals it deems
dangerous, or suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 12 5 The constitu-
tionality of detention, therefore, rests in large part on its pur-
pose. 1 26 A court must examine whether the deprivation of liberty is
imposed for the purpose of punishment or rather in furtherance of
regulatory goals and, if in furtherance of regulatory goals, whether
the deprivation is excessive in relation to the purpose of depriva-
tion.1 27 Furthermore, the provision must be targeted to a "small
segment" of individuals and must apply strong procedural protec-
tions. The same inquiry is required for immigration deprivation.' 28
1. The War against Terrorism: A "Special Circumstance"
The alien detention provision of the USA Patriot Act serves
three purposes. First, it grants the Department of Justice the ability
to continuously investigate individuals it reasonably believes may
122. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.").
123. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987).
124. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
125. The government's ability to detain individuals it deems dangerous was shown
in the holding in Korematsu v. U.S. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
There, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of internment camps which
were the impetus for the internment of 1 10,000 Japanese-Americans during World War
II. Id. In 1861, during the Civil War, there was a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
- the right to know why a person is detained to ensure that the imprisonment is not
illegal. President Abraham Lincoln revoked the right for secessionists and those sus-
pected of disloyalty. See e.g., Halbert, Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus by President
Lincoln, 2 AM.J. LEGAL HisT. 95 (1958) (discusses the circumstances surrounding Presi-
dent Lincoln's decision to suspend the writ of habeas corpus).
126. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748 (citing Carlson, 342 U.S. 524); Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418 (1979);Jackson, 406 U.S. at 715).
127. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
128. See Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1441-42, amended by,
997 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268-269 (1984),
which discusses balancing the length of detention with regulatory goals).
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have an involvement in terrorism. Second, it protects the nation
from any subsequent terrorist activity that the alien may engage in.
Third, it ensures the alien-terrorist suspect will be present at a fu-
ture deportation hearing.
The first justification behind § 412 of the Patriot Act is that it
allows the Department ofJustice to continuously investigate individ-
uals it reasonably believes may have involvement in terrorism. In
essence, mass detention of terrorist suspects will assist authorities in
the largest criminal investigation in U.S. history. The complexity of
the case requires officials to hold on to anyone who may have infor-
mation, especially if that person already is living illegally in the
United States. Ordinarily, while alien removal proceedings are in
progress, most aliens may be released on bond or paroled.1 29 Along
with the increased latitude to detain comes enormous responsibil-
ity. No one wants a situation in which they would have to release a
possible terrorist on some technicality.
13 0
Next, the detention of the alien-terrorist suspect protects the
nation from any subsequent terrorist activity that the alien may en-
gage in. The Patriot Act prevents instances where terrorists can be
released on bond, only to commit crimes of mass murder.131 Their
ability to be released on bond, and subsequently escape, would put
the nation in grave danger. Consider the unprecedented problem
that may well be presented by some of the individuals that the jus-
tice Department has arrested or taken into custody for questioning
129. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1226(a)(2)(c) (2003).
130. Stuart Taylor Jr., How to Minimize the Risks of Overreacting to Terrorism, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 29, 2001. To immigration lawyer Angela Kelley, the mass detentions point to "the
beauty of immigration laws" to assist authorities in the largest criminal investigation in
U.S. history. The complexity of the case requires officials to hold on to anyone who may
have information, especially if that person already is living illegally in the US. She said,
"we're all equally shocked and appalled by these terrorists acts." Ms. Kelley, the deputy
director of the nonpartisan National Immigration Forum, also stated: "and we're hop-
ing for our own sake and our kids' sake it never happens again. All eyes are on the INS
right now." She said, "they're going to be very careful to cross their T's and dot their I's.
Nobody wants a situation in which they would have to release a possible terrorist on
some technicality." Id.
131. 142 Cong. Rec. 7972 (1996). The government cited statistical studies showing
high recidivism rates for released aliens (77%) in the congressional floor debates on
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
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with regard to the September 11th attacks. 13 2 Assume that after a
more expansive investigation, many of those arrested prove to be
entirely uninvolved in terrorism or other illegality; that the govern-
ment uncovers enough evidence to charge many others with immi-
gration violations or crimes, perhaps including complicity in the
September 11th mass murders; and that the information available
on the others (e.g., twenty-five of them) would leave a reasonable
prosecutor or judge thinking: "This man is probably no threat, but
there's maybe one chance in three, or four, or five, or ten that he's
a terrorist bent on mass murder."133 What should the government
and the courts do with those suspects in this last group? With, for
example, a (hypothetical) Pakistani biochemistry major at
Princeton University who had downloaded articles about how ter-
rorists might use small planes to start an anthrax epidemic, and had
shown an intense but unexplained interest in crop-dusters?134 Or,
perhaps, with a (hypothetical) Iraqi refugee who had been photo-
graphed at a Beirut restaurant frequented by followers of Osama
Bin Laden, had recently toured New York City's Empire State Build-
ing three times during a one-week trip to New York, and had left in
his motel room a news article detailing how terrorists might suc-
ceed in leveling a high-rise building through the strategic place-
ment of explosives.' 3 5 If these two individuals were held for
deportation hearings and there was not a foreseeable deportation
proceeding, then under a strict interpretation of the Zadvydas case,
they must be offered bond or be released.
The fact is, Americans were frightened by the prospect of ter-
rorism before either the Oklahoma City bombing or the attacks of
September 11 th, 2001.136 Now that this fear has been substantiated,
132. Stuart Taylor Jr., Let's Debate - Ashcroft's Bill to Combat Terrorism Will Quickly Pro-





136. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese Americans Redress and the
"Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN L.J. 1 (2001). This article makes refer-
ence to, and criticizes, a study that noted that the American and Canadian public con-
sider terrorism a bigger threat to their personal safety than driving on the freeways,
even though the number of U.S. citizens killed in terrorist incidents around the world
the year of the poll was only one quarter the number killed that year by lighting.
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and the government is on notice to the threat of future attacks,
preemptive actions must be taken. Therefore, it is reasonable to de-
tain an individual that may be a terrorist until further investigation
is completed.
Finally, § 412 ensures that the terrorist suspect will be present
at future deportation hearings. In the months following September
l1th, over 1,000 people were detained for possible connections to
the attacks. Many of these individuals are being held in custody
based on a violation of immigration status - they have violated the
law. 3 7 Attorney General John Ashcroft states that the Department
of Justice must have the ability to keep them in jail and not have
them bonded out. Statistical studies show high recidivism rates for
released aliens. 138 One Government Accounting Office study, cited
by Congress in floor debates on the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, put the figure as high as seventy-seven
percent. 139 This means that over three-quarters of those aliens that
have an immigration hearing fail to appear. This must not be al-
lowed to happen with potential terrorists. "Illegal aliens who have
links to those who are part of a terrorist network, pose an increased
risk and must be kept off the streets."'
40
2. The "Small Segment" Defined
In addition to the presence of "special circumstances," a law
that provides for the potential of indefinite detention must apply to
a "small segment" of individuals.' 4 1 Here, the law allows the Attor-
ney General to detain an alien where there are "reasonable
grounds" to believe he has: (A) engaged, inter alia, in security viola-
tions that include espionage, sabotage, and a multitude of terrorist
activities; 142 or, (B) is engaged in any other activity that
137. Id.
138. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
139. Id.
140. Joyce Howard Price, Ashcroft Urges Stricter Laws to Jail Alien Suspects Longer,
WASHINGTON TiMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at Al.
141. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 667.
142. § 412 (a) (3) states that "the Attorney General may certify an alien.., if he has
reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is described in §§§§§§ 212(a) (3) (A) (i),
212 (a) (3) (A) (iii), 212 (a)(3)(B), 237 (a) (4) (A) (i), 237 (a) (4) (A) (iii), or 237
(a) (4) (B). The full text of these provisions are described below: § 212 (a) (3) (A) (i): "(3)
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Security and related grounds. (A) In general. Any alien who a consular officer or the
Attorney General knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, seeks to enter the United
States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in- (i) any activity (I) to violate any
law of the United States relating to espionage or sabotage or (II) to violate or evade any
law prohibiting the export from the United States of goods, technology, or sensitive
information." § 212(a) (3) (A) (iii): "any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to,
or the control or overthrow of, the Government of the United States by force, violence,
or other unlawful means, is inadmissible." § 212(a) (3) (B): "(B) Terrorist activities. (i)
In general. Any alien who- (I) has engaged in a terrorist activity, (II) a consular officer
or the Attorney General knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, is engaged in or is
likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity (as defined in clause (iii)), (III) has,
under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily harm,
incited terrorist activity, (IV) is a representative (as defined in clause (iv)) of a foreign
terrorist organization, as designated by the Secretary under section 219 [8 USCS
§ 1189], or (V) is a member of a foreign terrorist organization, as designated by the
Secretary under section 219 [8 USCS § 1189], which the alien knows or should have
known is a terrorist organization is inadmissible. An alien who is an officer, official,
representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization is considered,
for purposes of this Act, to be engaged in a terrorist activity. (ii) Terrorist activity de-
fined. As used in this Act, the term "terrorist activity" means any activity which is unlaw-
ful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if committed in the
United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and
which involves any of the following:
(I) The hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or
vehicle).
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain,
another individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organ-
ization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the
release of the individual seized or detained. (III) A violent attack upon an internation-
ally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b) (4) of title 18, United States Code)
or upon the liberty of such a person. (IV) An assassination. (V) The use of any- (a)
biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or (b) explosive or fire-
arm (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or
indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to prop-
erty. (VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. (iii) Engage in
terrorist activity defined. As used in this Act, the term "engage in terrorist activity"
means to commit, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization, an act of
terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords
material support to any individual, organization, or government in conducting a terror-
ist activity at any time, including any of the following acts: (I) The preparation or plan-
ning of a terrorist activity. (II) The gathering of information on potential targets for
terrorist activity.
(III) The providing of any type of material support, including a safe house, transporta-
tion, communications, funds, false documentation or identification, weapons, explo-
sives, or training, to any individual the actor knows or has reason to believe has
committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity. (IV) The soliciting of funds or other
things of value for terrorist activity or for any terrorist organization. (V) The solicitation
of any individual for membership in a terrorist organization, terrorist government, or to
engage in a terrorist activity.
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endangers the national security of the United States. 143
It is important to differentiate those who are arrested on immi-
gration grounds, and therefore subject to questioning and deporta-
tion, and those who are deemed terrorist threats subject to
prosecution and possibly deportation. Each alien who violates im-
migration laws or local laws can expect to be taken into custody.
144
Like an American citizen, rule-violators are subject to punishment
under the law. Predictably, the war on terrorism has amplified the
enforcement of even relatively minor infractions. The Attorney
General warned at the Mayor's conference that if a terrorist over-
stays his visa - even by one day - he will be arrested. t 45 Moreover,
Ashcroft stated that if a suspected terrorist violates a local law, he
will be placed in jail and kept in custody as long as possible. 146 This
is an unconventional war where every available statute must be uti-
lized in order to gain a prosecutorial advantage. If suspects are
found not to have links to terrorism or not to have violated the law,
they are released. 147 But terrorists who are in violation of the law
will be convicted, in some cases deported, and in all cases pre-
vented from doing further harm to Americans. 48 However strict
this may seem to those aliens with no ties to terrorism, it must be
expected at times of war when the enemy is relatively unknown.
(iv) Representative defined. As used in this paragraph, the term "representative" in-
cludes an officer, official, or spokesman of an organization, and any person who directs,
counsels, commands, or induces an organization or its members to engage in terrorist
activity."
§ 237(a) (4) (A) (i): "(4) Security and related grounds. (A) In general. Any alien who has
engaged, is engaged, or at any time after admission engages in- (i) any activity to
violate any law of the United States relating to espionage or sabotage or to violate or
evade any law prohibiting the export from the United States of goods, technology, or
sensitive information."
§ 237(a) (4) (A) (iii): "any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control
or overthrow of, the Government of the United States by force, violence, or other un-
lawful means, is deportable."
§ 237(a) (4) (B): "Terrorist activities. Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any
time after admission engages in any terrorist activity (as defined in § 212(a) (3) (B) (iii)
[8 USCS § 1182(a) (3) (B) (iii)]) is deportable."
143. § 412 (a)(6).
144. John Ashcroft, Attorney General's Prepared Remarks for the United States Mayor's







The Patriot Act provides that the Attorney General may detain
an alien if he has reasonable grounds to believe he is either a threat
to national security or is involved in an activity related to terrorism
or government overthrow. 149 Critics maintain that the reasonable
grounds standard is subject to abuse because it is too subjective. 150
In times of war, it is unreasonable to expect the Department of
Justice to furnish evidence amounting to probable cause for each
suspected terrorist. Terrorists operate on a variety of levels. As the
hypothetical presented in section (IV) (B) (1) illustrates, some activi-
ties by aliens raise serious concern. However, this concern may not
reach the level of probable cause - at least not without further
investigation.
All Americans must expect restrictions on their personal free-
doms. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recognized
this after inspecting the disaster site in New York City: "We're likely
to experience more restrictions on our personal freedom than has
ever been the case in this country."' 151 Simply stated, if we do not
prevent terrorists from taking away our liberties, we will not have
any liberties and we will not have the freedoms that we have all
taken for granted.
B. The Disparate Impact on the Arab Community
Undoubtedly, the Act will have the most effect upon the Mus-
lim and Arab communities. 152 The Government did not explicitly
target ethnic groups, however. The detention based upon legiti-
mate immigration violations and subsequent terror inquiries are a
product of circumstance. Ultimately, the government gained sub-
stantial evidence that the acts of terrorism were carried out by
members of the AI-Qaeda terrorist network, which is largely made
149. See supra note 27.
150. How the Anti-Terrorism Bill Permits Indefinite Detention of Immigrants Who Are Not
Terrorists, American Civil Liberties Union (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://
www.aclu.org/congress/1 102301e.html.
151. Id.
152. In the United States, there are approximately 6.5 million Muslims and about 3
million persons of Arab descent, some of whom are Muslim but most of whom are
Christian. Muslims Move into Political Arena in U.S., FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, October 22,
1999, available at 1999 WL 29069360.
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up of Muslim, middle-eastern males. Therefore, it is more likely to
scrutinize and detain individuals who fit this description.
Regardless, if de jure discrimination were proven, the Act
would still withstand constitutional challenge under established Su-
preme Court precedent. For example, in the landmark case of Kore-
matsu v. United States, the high court held that "pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify racial restrictions."' 15 3 Korematsu has
yet to be overturned, and it demonstrates the extent to which the
Supreme Court will go to allow the other branches of government
leeway during war. In a recent book on civil liberty and wartime,
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist defended much of the Kore-
matsu decision, including the central principle that courts must de-
fer to the government where national security is at stake.
154
V. CONCLUSION
America's Founding Fathers 155 had a very important concep-
tion of freedom. It wasn't just freedom to do anything or to associ-
ate for any purpose, but to do those things that do not harm others
and which, it was hoped, would advance the common good. Doug-
las Kmiec,' 56 before the SenateJudiciary Committee, intimated that
freedom separated from truth is not freedom at all but license and
153. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
154. Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated his strong support of the Korematsu
decision in his recent book.
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George, Baldwin, Abraham, Few, William, Houstoun, William, Pierce, William L., Car-
roll, Daniel, Jenifer, Daniel of St. Thomas, Martin, Luther, McHenry, James, Mercer,
John F., Gerry, Elbridge, Gorham, Nathaniel, King, Rufus, Strong, Caleb, Gilman,
Nicholas, Langdon, John, Brearly (Brearley), David, Dayton, Jonathan, Houston, Wil-
liam C., Livingston, William, Paterson (Patterson), William, Hamilton, Alexander, Lan-
sing, John, Jr., Yates, Robert, Blount, William, Davie, William R., Martin, Alexander,
Spaight, Richard D., Williamson, Hugh, Clymer, George Fitzsimons (FitzSimons; Fitz-
simmons), Thomas, Franklin, Benjamin, Ingersoll, Jared Mifflin, Thomas, Morris,
Gouverneur, Morris, Robert, Wilson, James, Butler, Pierce Pinckney, Charles, Pinck-
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McClurg, James, Randolph, EdmundJ., Washington, George, Wythe, George. See The
Founding Fathers, Delegates to the Constitutional Convention, National Archives and
Records Administration, available at http://www.nara.gov/exhall/charters/constitu-
tion/confath.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2001).




Congress can no longer afford, if it ever could, to confuse freedom
and license, because in doing so, license is not freedom, but
terrorism. 
157
The USA Patriot Act, signed into law by President George W.
Bush on October 25, 2001, affords the Attorney General the author-
ity to detain dangerous terrorist suspects, subject to a multitude of
safeguards. 158 Since the USA Patriot Act explicitly states the powers
of the Attorney General, and because preventative detention is es-
sential during the war on terrorism, the Supreme Court's recent
holding in Zadvydas, that indefinite detention of aliens was uncon-
stitutional, would not apply. Therefore, the Supreme Court must
resist any attempt to utilize the narrow holding in Zadvydas as a
mechanism to overturn § 412 of the USA Patriot Act.
157. Protecting Constitutional Freedoms From Infringement By Counterterrorism Efforts,
2001:
Hearing Before the Federalism and Property Rights Subcomm., Senate Judicialy Comm., 107th
Cong. (statement of Douglas Kmiec, Dean, Columbus School of Law) (Oct. 3, 2001).
158. H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).
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